	NACSNGUS	
1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
4	V.	07 CR 1121 (PAE)
5	HOA DUC NGUYEN,	
6	Defendant.	
7	x	
8		New York, N.Y. October 12, 2023
		3:00 p.m.
10	Before:	
11 12	HON. PAUL A. ENGE	LMAYER,
13		District Judge
14	APPEARANCES	
15	DAMIAN WILLIAMS	
16	United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York	
17	BY: JACKIE DELLIGATTI Assistant United States Attorney	.7
18	ARLO DEVLIN-BROWN	Y
19	PATRICK MATTINA Attorneys for Defendant	
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1	(Case called)	
2	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel, starting with the front	
3	table, please state your appearance for the record.	
4	MS. DELLIGATTI: Good afternoon, your Honor.	
5	Jackie Delligatti for the government.	
6	THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon. Thank you.	
7	MR. MATTINA: Patrick Mattina for Mr. Nguyen and I'm	
8	joined here today by Arlo Devlin-Brown.	
9	THE COURT: Very good.	
10	Good afternoon, Mr. Mattina.	
11	Good afternoon, Mr. Devlin-Brown.	
12	And, of course, good afternoon to you, Mr. Nguyen.	
13	Mr. Mattina, am I correct that your client's last name	
14	is pronounced Nguyen?	
15	MR. MATTINA: I'm told it's pronounced Nguyen.	
16	THE COURT: I will try to be sensitive to that.	
17	May I ask you, Mr. Mattina. This is, of course, the	
18	first proceeding I've had with Mr. Nguyen.	
19	Does Mr. Nguyen speak English?	
20	MR. MATTINA: Yes, your Honor.	
21	THE COURT: Good afternoon, in any event, to you.	
22	THE DEFENDANT: Good afternoon to you, your Honor.	
23	THE COURT: Before we begin, first of all, I want to	
24	thank defense counsel for taking on this representation, and	
25	second of all, I need to make the following disclosure which is	

known to the defense, but will not be known to the government, which is to say that Mr. Devlin-Brown is a friend of mine.

He and I worked together for a number of years long ago at the WilmerHale law firm, and I was very pleased to be a reference for Mr. Devlin-Brown when he applied to be an AUSA, and I consider myself still a friend and a mentor to him. I assume that does not in any way concern the government in terms of the defense's service, or rather my service on the case, but I wanted to put it on the record.

MS. DELLIGATTI: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: With that, we're here today to reimpose sentence in the case of United States v. Hoa Duc Nguyen. Some background is necessary at the outset.

After entering guilty pleas in 2007 and 2008 to numerous counts spanning five indictments, Mr. Nguyen, on February 21, 2012, was sentenced by the Honorable Deborah Batts to an overall sentence of 300 months' imprisonment.

Relevant here, as constructed by Judge Batts, the sentence imposed was of 240 months on each of seven counts, 60 months on each of two counts, and 120 months on each of two counts. All of those to run concurrently with one another.

Additionally, as relevant here, Mr. Nguyen was sentenced to a 60-month term of imprisonment on each of two firearms counts on what the government calls, and which I will call today, indictment number three. And that 60-month term

was to run concurrently across the two firearms counts, but consecutive to the 240-month sentence imposed collectively on all the other counts.

The 300-month or 25-year sentence that Judge Batts imposed reflected a very substantial downward departure reflecting the defendant's substantial assistance. Absent the; downward departure, Mr. Nguyen's was having an offense level of 48 and a criminal history category IV, calling for a sentence of life imprisonment.

But for the government's motion under Section 5K1.1 of the guidelines and Section 3553(E) of Title 18, Mr. Nguyen would have faced a mandatory life sentence on one count, Count One of indictment one, and among other mandatory outcomes, mandatory consecutive sentence on the two firearms counts from indictment number three that I affected earlier.

Closer to the present, on December 16, 2022, Mr. Nguyen filed a motion for compassionate release. In a decision issued April 3, 2023, this court -- which had been reassigned the case following the untimely death of Judge Batts -- denied the motion, finding no basis to reduce the defendant's sentence.

However, in that same decision, the court did note that in light of intervening case law, specifically the case of *United States v. Taylor*, 142 S. Ct. 2015, the two firearms counts in indictment number three which had been brought under

Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c) were no longer legally valid.

The court invited Mr. Nguyen to move to vacate those counts and to pursue resentencing on the many surviving counts. The court noted that because the basis for invalidating the two firearm counts was a strictly technical one that had nothing whatsoever to do with Mr. Nguyen, there was no assurance on resentencing the court would not impose the same aggregate sentence as before, just distributed differently among the surviving counts.

The purpose of this proceeding in the first instance is for the court to receive a motion to dismiss Counts Three and Four of indictment number three in light of *Taylor*, and then to proceed to resentencing.

So with that, government counsel, is there a motion to dismiss those two firearms counts?

MS. DELLIGATTI: Yes, your Honor.

The government moves to dismiss Counts Three and Four of indictment three.

THE COURT: OK. Defense, I take it nothing to add to that.

MR. MATTINA: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: That motion is granted. I dismiss those two counts in light of *Taylor*.

With that, are counsel now prepared to proceed to

sentencing?

MS. DELLIGATTI: Yes, your Honor.

MR. MATTINA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So in anticipation that that would be the case, I have reviewed a number of things. I have reviewed the case background before Judge Batts, including the transcript of sentencing from 2012. I've also reviewed the original presentence report, I've reviewed the supplemental presentence report prepared by the probation department and filed on August 10 of this year. It is docketed at docket 32.

I have also received the following additional submissions: First, the defense's sentencing submission which is dated September 28, plus various attachments. Among other things, these include a letter from the defendant, other letters in support of the defendant, and extracts of the defendant's Bureau of Prisons sentencing records. I've reviewed the government's sentencing submission dated October 6. I have also recently received yesterday a letter from the defense which helpfully gives the court a roadmap on the premise that the court was inclined to reduce sentence and to do so in a manner requested by the defense of a manner in which the sentences might be imposed on the many surviving counts to achieve that.

I thank you for that. I hadn't expected that submission, but certainly understand why, were the court

1	inclined to go in that direction, such a letter would have been		
2	of assistance or would be of assistance.		
3	Have the parties received each of these submissions?		
4	MS. DELLIGATTI: Yes, your Honor.		
5	MR. MATTINA: Yes.		
6	THE COURT: And has anything else been submitted in		
7	connection with this sentencing?		
8	MS. DELLIGATTI: Not from the government, your Honor.		
9	THE COURT: Same two answers?		
10	MR. MATTINA: No, your Honor.		
11	THE COURT: Very good.		
12	Mr. Mattina, have you read the presentence report and		
13	the supplemental presentence report?		
14	MR. MATTINA: I have, your Honor.		
15	THE COURT: And have you discussed them with your		
16	client?		
17	MR. MATTINA: I have, your Honor.		
18	THE COURT: Mr. Nguyen, I know you had reviewed the		
19	original presentence report back in the day.		
20	Have you reviewed the supplemental presentence report?		
21	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.		
22	THE COURT: OK. Have you discussed these with your		
23	lawyers?		
24	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.		
25	THE COURT: Could you kindly move the microphone		

closer to you.

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Thank you.

Have you had the opportunity to go over with your lawyers any errors in the supplemental report or anything else that should be taken up with the court?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Delligatti, have you reviewed the supplemental presentence report?

MS. DELLIGATTI: I have, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Putting aside the calculation of the sentencing guidelines, does anybody, beginning with the government, have any objections to the report regarding its factual accuracy?

MS. DELLIGATTI: No, your Honor.

MR. MATTINA: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then hearing no objections, I will adopt the factual recitations set forth in the original presentence report and in the supplemental presentence report. The supplemental presentence report will be made a part of the record in this matter. It will be placed under seal. In the event an appeal is taken, counsel on appeal may have access to the sealed report without further application to this court.

Counsel, I assume the parties' sentencing submissions should be filed under seal given the references to the --

MR. MATTINA: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: -- to Section 5K1 and the like. 1 MS. DELLIGATTI: Your Honor, the government redacted 2 3 the portions of its letter that pertain to Mr. Nguyen's 4 cooperation, so I think it would be perfectly appropriate to 5 leave the redacted version --THE COURT: That's fine. 6 7 MS. DELLIGATTI: -- on the docket as it is. 8 THE COURT: I'm happy for your submission as redacted 9 then to be filed on the public docket. 10 Mr. Mattina, given the centrality of that topic to 11 your letter. I authorize you to simply file your report under 12 seal in its entirety. 13 MR. MATTINA: Your Honor, we have already filed 14 redacted versions on ECF. 15 THE COURT: On the other hand, that's fine, too. 16 Very good. Thank you. 17 All right. Turning to the sentencing guidelines, the 18 court is no longer required to follow the sentencing 19 quidelines, but I am required to consider the applicable 20 quidelines in imposing sentence. To do so, it's necessary that 21 the court accurately calculate the guidelines sentencing range. 22 In this case, there being a cooperation agreement, the 23 parties' plea agreement did not contain the stipulation as to 24 how the sentencing quidelines apply. Nonetheless, it appears

that the parties now agree with the probation department as to

how the guidelines prior to a downward departure apply. The probation department calculates an offense level of 43, a criminal history category of IV, yielding a predeparture guideline range of life imprisonment.

Do the parties agree with that calculation?

MS. DELLIGATTI: Yes, your Honor.

MR. MATTINA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then based on the parties' present agreement and the absence of objection, my independent evaluation, I accept the guideline calculation in the presentence report.

The next subject I need to cover is departures, which is to say within the guidelines framework.

Ms. Delligatti, is the government, much as it did in 2012, today moving for a downward departure under Section 5K1.1 and relief for such mandatory minimum sentences as remain pursuant to Section 3553(E)?

MS. DELLIGATTI: It is, your Honor, on the same grounds on which it moved at Mr. Nguyen's original sentencing.

THE COURT: Very good. I grant that motion.

A downward departure and a substantial one remains very much warranted in this case as it was at the original sentencing, and for the same reasons, I intend to depart downward today.

All right. Having taken care of those necessary

preliminaries, does the government wish to be heard with respect to sentencing?

MS. DELLIGATTI: Yes, your Honor.

Just briefly. I'll summarize what the government's position in its letter is. Of course, as your Honor is aware, what the government thinks is the appropriate sentence today is the same sentence that Judge Batts imposed many years ago, so that would be 300 months, I think technically to be imposed on the seven remaining counts for which Mr. Nguyen was sentenced to 240 months' imprisonment originally.

Your Honor --

THE COURT: You said seven.

MS. DELLIGATTI: I think there were seven of those counts, your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't think so. I thought my tabulation --

MS. DELLIGATTI: One, two, three, four, five, six, seven.

THE COURT: My calculation is that there were 11 counts, including the ones in California.

MS. DELLIGATTI: I think it was Counts One through Four of indictment one, your Honor; Count Two of indictment two; Counts One and Two of indictment three.

THE COURT: Sorry. Take a look at the supplemental presentence report, and it picks up the presentence report, the

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original one. And on the second page of the original 1 2 presentence report under penalties, it lists under offenses, it 3 lists 13 counts of which two have now gone away. 4 I see defense counsel lightly nodding. Mr. Mattina, 5 are you in agreement that there are 11 surviving counts? 6 MR. MATTINA: I am, your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Ms. Delligatti, I think this is really purely going to be a matter of counts and allegation. I think, 8 9 as a formal matter, I do need to impose sentence on 11 counts. 10 MS. DELLIGATTI: That's right, your Honor. There are 11 11 surviving counts. 12 I think a couple of those counts, Mr. Nguyen was 13 originally sentenced to a lower term of imprisonment to 120 14 months' imprisonment. But I think as a practical matter, your 15 Honor, resentencing on all 11 of those counts -- or 13, your 16 Honor, excuse me --17 THE COURT: There were 13. Two are gone. 18 MS. DELLIGATTI: So 11. 19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MS. DELLIGATTI: The government suggests would be 21 appropriate. 22 THE COURT: And you would recommend that that be 23 constructed in any particular way? 24 MS. DELLIGATTI: I think, your Honor, the government

would recommend it to be constructed similarly to what defense

1 | counsel recommended, but without the downward departure today.

So Counts One through Four of indictment one, Count
Two of indictment two; Counts One and Two of indictment three;
so the government's proposal would be that the sentence imposed
on those counts be 300 months.

THE COURT: Right, right.

In other words, to get there, as I understand it -- one moment. I'm just calling up the presentence report.

There appears to be only one count --

I see. In other words, the Counts One through Four of indictment one authorize a term of up to life imprisonment and, therefore, definitionally authorize a term of 25 years' imprisonment.

MS. DELLIGATTI: That's right, your Honor. Yes.

And so with respect --

THE COURT: And everything else would simply be the statutory maximum all to run concurrently.

MS. DELLIGATTI: Exactly, your Honor. Yes.

THE COURT: OK. Go ahead.

MS. DELLIGATTI: So, your Honor, the only other thing
I would highlight for the court is that I think it's clear from
our letter, the government does not dispute that the defendant
has, of course, served a majority of his sentence. The
government does not dispute that over the course of the time
the defendant has been in custody, he has shown some

rehabilitation.

But the principal question for these proceedings, your Honor, is whether the Section 3553(a) factors ought to be balanced differently and whether some sort of disruption of that balance now overriding the sentence that Judge Batts originally imposed.

That might be the case, your Honor, in resentencing proceedings where it's clear that the defendant was given more time because of the convictions that are now vacated or in resentencing proceedings where the guidelines are, in fact, different and lower now when the court is considering the defendant's convictions without the vacated convictions, your Honor.

But here, as your Honor noted, the guidelines remain unchanged. They remain life imprisonment, and as your Honor also noted, Mr. Nguyen received a huge break from the life sentence that the guidelines recommended in his original sentence in large part because of the same factors the defense or the court were to consider today.

So the fact of the matter, your Honor, is that this is not a case in which the circumstances have so changed, such that a reduction in sentence or a reassessment of the 3553(a) factors is warranted by the court. The government I think agrees, your Honor, that the most compelling reason for reducing a sentence here is a mere fact that the defendant has

served the vast majority of his sentence. But all the government would submit on that point, your Honor, is that that is not a principled reason in and of itself to reduce a sentence when considering the 3553(a) factors in balance.

The original sentence was more than appropriate. It was incredibly lenient. The government agreed with probation's recommendation, of course, in its 5K submission that the court should downwardly depart in that sentence, but there is no reason to reduce it any further now, your Honor.

THE COURT: It's an oddity, isn't it, that Judge Batts made the firearms counts consecutive, right?

I mean, she would have had to do so had there not been cooperation and the 3553(e) motion. But with the benefit of that motion, there was no obligation to run those two counts consecutive. She could have easily achieved the 25-year sentence, among other things, on the first four counts of indictment one.

Granted she doesn't say anything suggesting that of all things the firearms counts made a difference to her insofar as there were five people murdered. It is an oddity that she chose to do that.

MS. DELLIGATTI: Your Honor, candidly, I apologize.

I don't know the answer to the question of whether she had some liberty not to run those counts consecutively. I certainly take your Honor's credit, your Honor.

THE COURT: No. The reason why I say that is this is a familiar phenomenon before me --

MS. DELLIGATTI: Sure.

THE COURT: -- where the motion that's made under Section 5K1.1, that affords relief from the guideline range.

MS. DELLIGATTI: Also affords relief.

MS. DELLIGATTI: Correct.

THE COURT: So it seems to me that among many, many options, she had to get to 300 months or a number that wouldn't have assigned any unique value to the firearms offenses, which at least gives rise a little bit to the thought 2expoundment of is it possible that for some reason she attached some significance to them.

Countervailing that is common sense, which is that there were five people whom this man killed. The use of the firearm, as opposed to any other weapon in connection with that, is hard to see why that would add logical time to the balance. But it is an oddity.

MS. DELLIGATTI: I think that's right, your Honor. I think I would agree that I think, given the nature of the crime, it's not surprising that there was some separate sentence carved out for the use of firearms. I don't necessarily think that when you look at the sentencing

transcript as a whole, it suggests that Judge Batts would have imposed a different sentence had there not been the two firearms counts, especially considering the difference between the sentence she did impose on the other counts which carried a much higher guideline sentence.

THE COURT: Right. I suppose the other --

Just a moment. I suppose the other relevant point is that even if there was a reason to think that she thought the firearms offense materially influenced the just overall sentence, the facts underlying the dismissed counts remain the same. It's purely the legal technicality of how the categorical rule applies to them.

So even if we indulge that Judge Batts found the presence of a firearm to be a big deal and amid all the other crimes here, the fact of the substance of those crimes having been committed remains the same. It's merely a technical change this law.

MS. DELLIGATTI: I think that's right, your Honor, which is, of course, why the Second Circuit and other circuits have found quite easily that a court is, of course, perfectly entitled to impose the same sentence when looking at the same underlying factual record, even considering the vacated counts.

THE COURT: OK. All right. Thank you.

Anything further from the government?

MS. DELLIGATTI: No, your Honor. Thank you.

bottom.

1 THE COURT: Mr. Mattina, I take it you'll be taking 2 lead. 3 MR. MATTINA: Yes, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Go ahead. 5 MR. MATTINA: Your Honor, we're here today to make 6 what we believe to be a reasonable and modest request that 7 Mr. Nguyen be sentenced to time served with five years of supervised release. Mr. Nguyen's projected to be released in 8 9 July 2024, so essentially we're asking for a nine-month 10 reduction in his original sentence. 11 What we want to focus on today is what's changed since 12 2012, since Mr. Nguyen was originally sentenced. We want to 13 focus on three changes. The first is Mr. Nguyen's health, the 14 second is his rehabilitation, and the third is the time he 15 spent in prison during the COVID-19 pandemic. 16 THE COURT: Sorry. On that one --17 MR. MATTINA: Yes. 18 THE COURT: -- I would have been open to that 19 argument, but not on your papers. I'm not going to consider it 20 being raised now. It's simple too late. MR. MATTINA: I believe we do make reference to it in 21 22 our submission. If I could have a moment. 23 THE COURT: Tell me where it is. 24 MR. MINEAR: Your Honor, it's on page 11 at the very 25

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MATTINA: It carries on to page 12.

THE COURT: That literally doesn't cut it. This is the entire of it.

Mr. Nguyen was imprisoned for the determination of the COVID-19 pandemic, and then it quotes language that I cited in a different case involving the price exacted there. But there is not word one in the papers here about Mr. Nguyen's experience in COVID-19. I will tell you that as I have released many defendants based on representations of the asthma that they had or why the pandemic was affecting themselves medically or threatened to do so, I've released prisoners based on a factual showing that they were in crowded municipal facilities where there is a heightened risk of getting COVID-19, but there is literally not one word about Mr. Nguyen's experience with COVID-19. He didn't say anything about that in the compassionate release motion.

And the memo here doesn't say anything about what the conditions were like at Lompoc, whether he had some medical condition, whether he even got COVID-19. So with respect, COVID-19 is not an automatic get-out-of-jail-early card. It requires some degree of factual substantiation. It's way too late for that at the oral part of the sentencing hearing where all that is stated is that his time in Lompoc coincided with COVID-19. I have to take that off the table. Had you made

that argument, I would have been interested, and the government would have had an opportunity to respond. There might have been some factual portrait of what the experience was like.

Sorry about that, but, I mean...

MR. MATTINA: That's fine, your Honor. If I can -THE COURT: I'm sorry.

MR. MATTINA: We do say at the end of that sentence, that was obviously not contemplated at the time of Judge batts' original sentence.

THE COURT: And --

MR. MATTINA: I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- it is correct that it wasn't contemplated. The problem is that there is literally nothing that you've given me that tells me what it was like for him. In the MCC here, it was a horror show. In some of the FCIs, there were dreadful experiences. There were experiences for people who had underlying respiratory risks.

And then there were situations where the factual submissions that I was getting in, for example, the service of compassionate release motions simply did not make out prison conditions that were so far off the mark as to be that consequential. I just don't know what the facts are here.

MR. MATTINA: Understood, your Honor.

If I may. We were going to expound upon Mr. Nguyen's services, Mr. Nguyen's, during oral argument. I understand

you're saying we missed the boat, so to speak.

THE COURT: As a matter of basic evidentiary fairness, you would be making a factual proffer to me about what his experience has been like under COVID. Under those circumstances, the government's really in no position to be able to respond. I mean, it was surprising to me, to be honest with you, that COVID was absent either from his application for compassionate release or having been alerted by the nature of my denial of that motion, not to say something about it with factual backup here.

But it was the dog that didn't bark in the defense submission here. It has worked for many but not all defendants. But I took the defense sentencing submission to be saying that there is nothing that distinguishes him from any prisoner in the United States who happened to be in prison, you know, beginning and going forward from March of 2020.

Sorry to say that, but...

MR. MATTINA: But that was not the intention. I understand your Honor's point.

THE COURT: Good.

MR. MATTINA: So I'll move on to -- I'll focus on the two points that I was originally going to speak about.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MATTINA: The first change is Mr. Nguyen's health.

As the medical records reflect, over the past year or so he's

been suffering from stomach issues, and the best way to describe it to the court is that these are flareups or episodes, so to speak. When they happen, he has quite severe abdominal pain. He can't hold food down. He can't sleep. He becomes weak and he vomits for days in a row.

Mr. Nguyen has not received a diagnosis, and we don't want to speculate as to what is causing his symptoms, but...

THE COURT: Tell me why he hasn't had a diagnosis.

MR. MATTINA: Your Honor, he has asked for treatment, from what we can tell from the record --

THE COURT: Has or has not?

MR. MATTINA: Has made requests for treatment.

From what we can tell from the records, the extent to which that request has been met is that he's been ordered, sent for an X-ray of his abdomen, and also given laxatives. That is what we can tell from the records.

We don't want to speculate as to what is causing these issues, but his family and friends have written to the court to express their concerns.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question. He ought to get adequate treatment to get to the bottom of what's happening here, but that's a familiar situation that this court experiences with defendants who don't happen to be before me for a technical resentencing. And counsel will, for example, ask the court to issue an order that effectively directs the

Bureau of Prisons to furnish medical care sometimes relating to eyesight, sometimes relating to diabetes, or other things.

I am happy to do that and stand ready to do that.

While there are some limits to what I can make the executive branch do, that is an order I feel completely comfortable issuing. And although I have no experience with Lompoc, I can tell you that the prisons that have tended to receive those orders have tended to respond to them with some dispatch.

Why isn't the more limited remedy for you to get me an order, which I'll be delighted to issue tomorrow, that directs the facility to step up its game in terms of his treatment?

MR. MATTINA: Because, your Honor, we are concerned that the Bureau of Prisons just isn't able to treat him properly. And I think the government admits in their letter to the court that, of course, Mr. Nguyen would receive more favorable care if he was a free man.

THE COURT: Look, the problem is we're at the stage we don't even have a diagnosis. So to talk about the treatment is putting the cart ahead of the horse. We don't know yet what the diagnosis is, and that would be in the spirit of what he needs. But to say he should get out of jail when we haven't even tried, for example, the lesser restrictive alternative of the court's directing the Bureau of Prisons to get its act together and get him a diagnosis, seems to me skipping a step.

MR. MATTINA: Your Honor, our view is that the failure

to diagnose is the inadequate care and, you know, it's not our fault that we're putting the cart before the horse, so to speak. If they would adequately diagnose, we wouldn't have to --

THE COURT: I appreciate that.

Look, I appreciate from where the defense in this case stands, you have not been assigned to represent Mr. Nguyen for a long period of time. And from the moment you took on the representation, there was effectively a resentencing not long on the horizon.

The problem may simply be that Mr. Nguyen, until the accident of the combination of *Taylor* and then the opinion denying compassionate release identifying the *Taylor* problem with two of his convictions, he didn't have any lawyer to shake the trees for him and to get a judge to write Lompoc to say, by order, get this treatment, get this diagnosed. But where we are now is that that remains an available option.

And it seems to me -- tell me why it's unreasonable to proceed this way -- for you to get me an order that is tailored to the draft order that is tailored to his needs to get him a diagnosis and fast, and if it turns out that Lompoc is blowing that off, you then have, albeit in the form of a compassionate release motion, something to work with.

But without having explored that option, candidly, the fact that he is vomiting and his stomach hurts doesn't seem to

me to be a basis to release, to shorten the sentence that Judge Batts imposed.

MR. MATTINA: Understood.

THE COURT: Look, if you are having some pushback on it, I'm happy to hear it. Better for me to tell you what I'm thinking about that and give you a chance.

MR. MATTINA: Absolutely, your Honor. Understood. And we want to focus today on what's changed since 2012, and that's one of the things that has changed since 2012. And I understand your Honor is not going to entertain my third thing that's changed since 2012, but I would like to move on to the second, if that's OK.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MATTINA: The second thing that's changed is Mr. Nguyen himself. Over the last 20 years, he has shown remorse and taken steps to become a better man. And actions speak louder than words, and I don't want to misquote the government. But from what I heard today, they are singing a different tune than they were in response to his motion for compassionate release.

In that motion, they say they certainly commend

Mr. Nguyen for his clear efforts to make productive use of his

time in prison. I don't think that was the tone and tenor of

what you heard this afternoon about those rehabilitative steps.

At the time of his original sentencing, it was unknown what

Mr. Nguyen would do with his time in prison. We now know. We have an answer. This is a man whose taken steps to improve himself. I mean, he's gotten his GED. He has become English proficient. He's taken courses in computer education, culinary arts, nutrition. He's taken Spanish lessons and taken up welding. He's also taught fellow prisoners Chinese.

These are all voluntary steps that he's taken, not been ordered of him. Whether those steps are extraordinary, as the government says, they are not in their motion, that's not relevant for today's purposes whether it's extraordinary.

You know, the letters in support for Mr. Nguyen's family and friends add credibility to his actions. They have noticed the steps he's taken and extremely grateful for all of their support. But, your Honor, that didn't happen by accident. That's because of the steps he's taken. I would ask the court to please take that into consideration.

Skipping over my point on the pandemic conditions, that's what's changed since Mr. Nguyen was first sentenced, and we submit that when you look at those changes, when you look at his age, he's 57. When you look at the substantial assistance that he provided to the government to take down the Frank Ma organization, which was a violent mafia. That is what it was.

We struggle to see how it benefits anyone, either the public or Mr. Nguyen, to keep him in prison for nine more months, when this court has the ability to release a man who

has taken steps to better himself, has shown remorse to the victims, and has health issues. We struggle to see why we have to go through all the steps your Honor went through earlier to make applications for him to get medical treatment.

Your Honor can do that right now. He can get the best care in the world if he's released today. And so, you know, we ask you to please take that into account.

And Mr. Nguyen would like to address the court if that's OK.

THE COURT: OK. What's the plan for him after he's released, whether it's now or nine and a half months from now?

MR. MATTINA: Your Honor, he has family and friends in California. He has a place to live with a relative of his. He has a job in California just outside of Oakland at a construction company. I was quite amazed. I have been dealing with a good friend of his for 30 years, and I told him the court is going to ask me this very question. I'm going to have to have an answer as to what you're going to do with your time. That's his plan, and we have a letter in support from the employer saying he is —

THE COURT: Which I read with interest.

MR. MATTINA: Yes.

And I have the address of where he would live in Oakland.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Thank you to you and for the rest of your team for taking on the representation at short notice and very effectively.

MR. DEVLIN-BROWN: Your Honor, would it be possible if I just add a thing or two, or no?

THE COURT: Of course.

Just speak into the microphone.

MR. DEVLIN-BROWN: Certainly, your Honor.

So, on the health order issue, I really do think that's two tracks, because for one thing under 3553(a), right, and we're sentencing him as he is today, a court can, of course, consider the person's health in deciding the length of their sentence.

So I think it's sort of relevant as the man he is today, not the man he was when he was sentenced before.

THE COURT: You're talking now about the stomach?

MR. DEVLIN-BROWN: The stomach, principally the stomach.

In terms of getting an order, I do think that is a separate track, and obviously if your Honor sentences him to the original sentence, that's something we would pursue. I think the complication there is we don't know if he's going to be at the MDC, how much longer he will be given the release date, or where he's going to be sent.

THE COURT: By the end of the proceeding you'll at

least know what the remaining length of the sentence is, and I'm happy to issue an order and tailor it as more information comes in. The real issue is you're absolutely right that I can take into account, and should, his current medical condition as it relates to his stomach. The problem is that, as described to me, it may be a big deal and it may be not such a big deal at all. It may be a matter of changed diet or a laxative or a prescription or something. I just don't know. I'm not a medical doctor.

But in the absence of demonstrated proof that this is a big deal, to cite the stomach pain as he has as a reason to lop nine and a half months off the effective sentence that Judge Batts imposed, with a lot of information in her hand, does not seem to me to be right. Seems to me that I'm sorry he's having stomach pain. I'm sorry he's throwing up.

He killed five people and the judge sentenced, set a sentence factoring all that into account. Stomach pain without a diagnosis of it as being, you know, durable, grave, a very big deal seems to me unpersuasive.

MR. DEVLIN-BROWN: With respect to, your Honor, I don't think that is what the record, even the existing record, reflects as to his stomach pain. There it reports in there, which are not contradicted, that he cannot eat for days and days at a time because he throws everything up. I think a colonoscopy is probably what -- I'm not a doctor either --

probably the logical next step. I don't know that that is possible in the Bureau of Prisons and, of course, your Honor --

THE COURT: I can assure you that whether it's within the Bureau of Prisons or through one of the providers with whom they have a medical contract, things much more esoteric than colonoscopies get ordered.

I've had difficult valve replacements. I've had stuff like that. So it's available. It's just a matter of getting him here, and he's very blessed to have a law firm that will now champion him as to that. To the extent it's not clear, I absolutely encourage your continued retention to follow up on that issue.

MR. DEVLIN-BROWN: Certainly, your Honor.

And then the other thing, I'll be brief, I just do
think it's important that we make a record of what your Honor
has ruled that you're not going to consider, because the
government hasn't had a chance to respond, but just so that
record is clear, our submission on COVID is not specific to
him. It's not that he had any unusual trouble. It's simply
that I don't know that there is any facility in this country -I don't know if the government would disagree -- where in those
first months of COVID, Bureau of Prisons locked everyone down.
They had limited ability to see or no ability to see anyone
outside, and that is not the sort of thing that was
contemplated at the time of the sentence.

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Does that mean someone should not have a very serious sentence still, given what the crimes are? Of course it doesn't. I think it is a factor, and with respect, that that at least should be considered. THE COURT: Fair enough. The record is made. you. All right. One moment. (Pause) Mr. Nguyen, do you wish to make a statement? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. First of all, I would like to say that --THE COURT: Little closer to the microphone, sir. THE DEFENDANT: I would like to thank God and I would like to thank the government for giving me a second chance in life. And I would like to take this time to say sorry to the victims' family. And I know -- sorry to the family of the victims for all the pain and grief that I've caused them, and I just want to say sorry to the government for all of my crime. And I do take full responsibility for my action. And that's all, your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Nguyen. I'm going to take a moment just to collect my thoughts. (Pause) I should is ask you, Ms. Delligatti, the nature of the

crimes here is such that, at the original sentencing anyway,
victims would have had the opportunity to participate?

It's been decades. I don't know whether there are
family members of any of the victims here who expressed an
interest then or expressed an interest now in participating.

I'm not sure how that works on a resentencing under these
technical circumstances, but I ought to raise the question with

you.

MS. DELLIGATTI: Your Honor, my understanding is that our office, in particular the victim witness coordinator, did make some effort to reach out to the victims and didn't receive a response from any of them.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

This will be several minutes.

(Pause)

Is there any reason why sentence should not now be imposed?

MS. DELLIGATTI: No, your Honor.

MR. MATTINA: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. As I stated, the guideline range that applies to this case is life imprisonment. However, the government has moved for a downward departure and relief from the mandatory minimum sentences on certain counts of conviction. And for the reasons given by Judge Batts, such relief is clearly warranted.

Under the Supreme Court's decision in *Booker* and the cases that have followed, the guideline range, even after taking into account a downward departure to reflect the defendant's substantial assistance, a court is still — the guideline range is still only one factor that a court must consider in deciding the just and appropriate sentence.

The court must also consider the other factors set forth in the sentencing statute Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a). These include the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment, the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and the need for the sentence imposed to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.

The court is also required to impose a sentence sufficient but no greater than necessary to comply, all in, with the purposes that I've just summarized. And here, I find that the sentence I'm about to pronounce is sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy the purposes of sentencing that I've just reviewed.

Today's resentencing presents something of an unusual situation. I was not the original sentencing judge. A long time has passed since the offenses of conviction, which largely occurred in and around the early 1990s. A long time has passed since Mr. Nguyen's arrest, which I understand to have been in May of 2003. A long time has passed since the original sentencing. I'm now in my 13th year on the bench. Mr. Nguyen was arrested more than 20 years ago. At the time that Judge Batts sentenced Mr. Nguyen, I had been on the bench for four and a half months.

I've done my best to familiarize myself with the history and underlying factors of the case. I've read the original presentence report. I've read the transcript of the original sentencing proceeding. I've read the materials submitted in connection with Mr. Nguyen's compassionate release motion, and I've read counsel's thoughtful recent submissions plus attachments submitted in advance of today's sentencing.

I've given thought methodologically as to how to approach the sentencing question today. My judgment on how to proceed is as follows: I'm going to treat the sentence imposed by Judge Batts as reflecting as of the date of the original sentencing, the proper balance of the 3553(a) factors, including credit for Mr. Nguyen's cooperation.

Now, I appreciate that counsel's recent letters have revisited those questions. The defense's letter emphasizing

the significant value of Mr. Nguyen's cooperation, the government's letter emphasizes the terrible gravity and number of his offenses, which include multiple murders, five to be precise, two of innocent bystanders and a sixth attempted murder, shootings, robberies, a great deal of violence, drug dealing, thefts of cars, and threats from computer chip manufacturers.

Judge Batts' sentencing remarks stated that she had assessed all of these factors. Although she did not explain in detail how she reached this result, she arrived at the conclusion that a 25-year overall sentence struck the right balance. She was known to me, and to the bar, as a thoughtful, deliberate jurist, who sweated the details and was characteristically always solicitous of the defense.

My judgment is to accept Judge Batts' thoughtful assessment as correct based on the information known as of February 21, 2012, the date of the original sentencing. I will then examine what to me is the critical question today on resentencing, which is what has happened since then, how if at all do those post-sentencing developments bear on the 3553(a) factors, and do any of those developments support modifying that sentence.

Before turning to that question, I will also say this for the benefit of the defense. Had I chosen a different methodology today in which I reassessed for myself how the

3553(a) factors and Mr. Nguyen's cooperation balanced out as of February 21, 2012, that would not have been to Mr. Nguyen's benefit. I'm absolutely certain that I would not have imposed an overall sentence below 25 years based on the information known at the time. I say that with the benefit of having, by now, presided over many cases alas involving murders and violence and having sentenced many cooperators in those cases.

From that experience, I have a pretty good sense how I would have viewed the just sentence, were I sitting where Judge Batts sat in February 2012. The gravity and scale and viciousness of the violence and murders here, in particular, would have weighed heavily with me. I would have viewed the need for just punishment in particular as immense. It is possible that I would have come up with the exact same sentence as Judge Batts did. It's also possible that I would not have rewarded Mr. Nguyen for his cooperation quite as generously as did Judge Batts.

As best that I can put myself in her shoes, I might well have imposed a higher sentence potentially one as high as five years higher, which is to say a sentence of 30 years' imprisonment. So in deciding to accept the balance struck by the always thoughtful Judge Batts, I am making a methodological call that, to the extent it benefits either party, it benefits the defense.

Again, it may be that, would I have imposed the same

sentence, all I know, I wouldn't have imposed a lower one.

So what subsequent developments might occasion a reassessment?

One possibility might have been hardship in prison due to the unexpected development that was COVID-19. That has been the basis for many reductions of sentence. During the peak of the pandemic, I ordered the early release of at least a couple of dozen prisoners, and I've imposed lower sentences in scores of cases based on unexpectedly arduous conditions of presentence custody, whether due to the pandemic or the horrific conditions of local prisons.

Mr. Nguyen has not meaningfully made that argument, although alone substantiated it. It was not made at all in pro se compassionate release motion, and it was only lightly touched upon in his counsel's advocacy on resentencing.

Specifically the only reference to COVID-19 was a generic single-sentence reference to the fact that Mr. Nguyen's prison term overlapped with the pandemic. But the defense submission is devoid of any factual detail on that point whether about Mr. Nguyen's medical or physical conditions or experience or journey or concretely how COVID-19 affected his experience at Lompoc. It may or may not be that a factually distinct narrative could have been developed specific to Mr. Nguyen and his journey during COVID-19, but I am unprepared to reduce the sentence of a defendant, let alone the considered sentence of a

serial murderer based on the bear incantation of the two words COVID and 19. COVID-19, or harsh prison conditions, are not factually available as a basis to deviating from Judge Batts' sentence.

Next, Mr. Nguyen describes himself as suffering or apparently suffering from a stomach condition. I say "apparently" because I don't know what the actual underlying condition is. I credit that he is having the symptoms that he describes. It has caused, he reports, significant weight loss and vomiting. I'm quite sympathetic to that situation.

But on the present record, it falls short of justifying a reduction of sentence. The course of the stomach condition is, as yet, undiagnosed. It may or may not prove to be a big deal. The Bureau of Prisons in my experience is capable of securing medical diagnoses and care sufficient to diagnose and likely treat Mr. Nguyen's condition. On the present record, there is no reason to believe that the BOP will be unable to diagnosis and treat that condition, particularly if ordered to do so, as this court stands ready to do.

The decisions of mine that the defense cites that have reduced sentences on account of a medical condition have involved much more dire situations. Those decisions, like United States v. Simon, typically were issued during the peak of the pandemic, before vaccinations were available, while people across the country, including in this city, were dying

of COVID-19 in droves. And they involved defendants with demonstrated medical conditions, such as obstructive pulmonary disorder or asthma, for which COVID-19 could easily cause death.

Mr. Nguyen is, as yet, not in any such demonstrable situation. He does have in common with many of the defendants whom I released during that period that he had served a significant majority of that sentence, but he has not established the companion factor in those cases, which is that he has a medical condition, in those cases one contraindication vis-a-vis COVID-19 warranting early release.

The defense next cites ways in which Mr. Nguyen has attempted, while in prison, to rehabilitate. He obtained a GED, became proficient in English, and has taken courses in Spanish, computer education, culinary arts, and welding. Those actions are, of course, all to the good. Mr. Nguyen has amassed very few disciplinary infractions, just one since July 2019, none sounding in violence since November 2008, which given his violent past, has to be viewed as progress.

Nonetheless, I cannot say that these facts are meaningfully out of the ordinary. I considered these facts at the time of Mr. Nguyen's application for compassionate release. I found that they did not rise to the level of extraordinary so as to qualify him for such relief.

Now, the standard is different at a resentencing

proceeding. The issue is not whether these actions are extraordinary and compelling, but whether they caused the court to weight 3553(a) factors or factor meaningfully differently than at the time of the original sentencing. My assessment is no. The court expects defendants to take advantage of basic resources offered at the BOP, and Mr. Nguyen as a cooperating witness presented himself at sentencing as having mended his ways and his intent on reflection and reform.

I cannot in good conscience say that the courses Mr. Nguyen has taken and his relatively good disciplinary report would have materially changed the sentencing calculus. For what it is worth, I doubt that Judge Batts, had she known in February 2012 that Mr. Nguyen was destined to take the courses he had and amassed the disciplinary record that he has, would have regarded those factors, though commendable, as terribly consequential in the context of the very grand considerations that dominated in either direction her sentencing assessment.

In the same vain, I have read the letters from Mr. Nguyen and from his family and friends.

These include his friend, Joanna Lam, who describes his stomach pains.

His son Justin, who has not seen him in 27 years, but spoken to him. He writes a few times over the phone and reports that Mr. Nguyen is "nothing but remorseful."

His lifelong friend, Lloyd Tran, who describes Mr. Nguyen as kind and gentle.

His friend, Muoi Liu, who values Mr. Nguyen's friendship, honesty, and generosity.

His friend, Terri Cao, who says that Mr. Nguyen has "changed his ways," and says that he and Mr. Nguyen will always be there for each other.

His friend, Khanh Trinh, who says that Mr. Nguyen has shown remorse and has a loving and supportive family.

His longtime family friend, Thuy Walburg Dizon, who says that Mr. Nguyen "deeply, deeply regrets his unfortunate incident," and that his family loves and needs him.

And JC Tran, a manager of a building company, who says he wants to give Mr. Nguyen a construction job upon his release.

It is, indeed, encouraging to read these letters. These letters, they tell me that Mr. Nguyen will have a real support network upon his release from custody. Candidly, though, these letters are a piece or of a piece are the positive character letters that the court is familiar with and receives at sentencing. I do not dispute the sincerity of any of them. None of them say anything concrete about Mr. Nguyen's rehabilitation, about the past 20 plus years in prison, let alone anything that stamps it as out of the ordinary.

The defense's final point is that Mr. Nguyen's release

date is close. His release date is, continuing good behavior, is under a year away. I understand it presently to be tabulated at July 26, 2024, which is some nine and a half months away. I appreciate the temptation to say, what's nine and a half more months measured against 20-plus years already served? What's the big deal?

But at the end of the day, an application for a change of a considered sentence has to be based on a change in law or a change in fact. Rigorous analysis, not sympathy, has to govern the court's decision.

argument at resentencing. The change in law here that has occasioned the resentencing has zero bearing on the just and reasonable sentence. It involves the entirely technical application of the categorical rule governing Section 924(c) as applied to the offense of attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery. It doesn't change any facts of Mr. Nguyen's offense conduct. And for the reasons I've stated, the material facts haven't, in my assessment, changed either.

If Judge Batts were presiding here today, I venture that she would have said there is nothing I'm hearing about today that is materially different from what, at the time of the sentencing, I would have expected to have heard about Mr. Nguyen some 20 years into the service of his sentence.

The bottom line is this: With regret, but with

firmness, I am simply unpersuaded there is a basis to alter the sentence imposed by Judge Batts. This will, therefore be, one of the those many sentencings, resentencings brought about by developments in Section 924(c) case law that results in the same aggregate sentence being imposed as before, with the terms of imprisonment allocated to different offenses of conviction rearranged, to yield the same aggregate sentence as before.

I commend defense counsel for the energy and vigor of your arguments on Mr. Nguyen's behalf and for jumping in with both feet to this representation. The facts, it appears, just weren't there. But I find overall the sentence as originally imposed, in its aggregate anyway, the lowest that can satisfy the 3553(a) factors considered as a whole.

I'm now going to state the sentence I intend to impose. The attorneys will have a final opportunity to make legal objections before the sentence is finally imposed.

Mr. Nguyen, would you please rise. And, counsel, because part of what I'm about to do is reallocate, I'm going to go slowly, I'm going to ask everyone to check my math and to check to make sure that what I'm saying with respect to the many counts that are out there is faithful to the statutory maximums that exists for each count.

Mr. Nguyen, after assessing the particular facts of this case and the factors under Section 3553(a), including the sentencing guidelines and including Section 5K1.1, it's the

judgment of the court that you are to serve an aggregate sentence of 300 months' imprisonment in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, to be followed by a period of five years' supervised release.

As to particular counts, I impose a term of 300 months' imprisonment on Counts One through Four of indictment one. I impose a term of 240 months' imprisonment on Count Two of indictment two and Counts One and Two of indictment three. I impose a 60-month sentence on Count One of indictment four and Count One of indictment five. I impose a 120-month sentence on Counts Two and 33 of indictment five. All of these sentences are to run concurrently with one another.

As to supervised release, I impose a five-year term of supervised release on Counts One through Four of indictment one, and a three-year term of supervised release on all the other counts. These terms are to run concurrently with one another.

Before I turn to the terms of supervised release, let me just pause for a moment and make sure that what I have just proposed to impose as the sentence is faithful to the statutory maximums for each count.

MS. DELLIGATTI: That's correct, your Honor, given the 20-year statutory maximum for indictments two and three.

THE COURT: OK. Defense?

MR. MATTINA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. As to supervised release, it is my intention to impose the identical terms of supervised release as imposed by Judge Batts.

Just one moment.

The one term that was imposed by Judge Batts that she singled out at the sentencing, I'll read what she wrote is:

The defendant shall be tested periodically at the direction of the Department of Probation for substance abuse, and should he test positive, he shall participate in a substance abuse prevention program, to be residential or nonresidential, as directed by the Department of Probation.

But it is my intention to impose all the mandatory conditions of supervised release and standard conditions of supervised release that are set out in the presentence report.

Let me ask you, Mr. Mattina, insofar as your client was present for the original sentencing and has read the judgment, is there any need for me to recite those out loud, or may I incorporate those by reference?

MR. MATTINA: That's unnecessary, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I'm not going to impose a fine. I am persuaded Mr. Nguyen does not have the ability to pay one.

Government counsel, was there either a forfeiture or restitution order the first time around?

MS. DELLIGATTI: Your Honor, I don't believe there was. I checked before the proceeding, and I couldn't find any record of it.

THE COURT: I did not either.

MS. DELLIGATTI: Yes.

THE COURT: Defense counsel, do you have anything different to share?

MR. MATTINA: No.

THE COURT: Then I will not impose forfeiture or restitution.

Now, there is the matter of the special assessment, and I could use your help here. Judge Batts, on the 13 counts, imposed an aggregate special assessment of \$950. Were I imposing sentence today, I would have fewer counts, 11 counts, but I think all 11 of them would require a \$100 special assessment, which would actually increase the special assessment. That has the field of substantial ex post facto, and I do not intend to do there.

Government counsel, understanding that the court is not going to raise the special assessment from before, and I do need to do this on a count-by-count basis, do you have an understanding of what the special assessment was that ran with the two firearms counts the first time around?

MS. DELLIGATTI: Your Honor, I'm sorry. Candidly, I don't.

THE COURT: Counsel, here is what I would like to do.

Under no circumstances am I going to impose a special
assessment that exceeds \$950. I am prepared to reduce the
special assessment by the amount that would have been in place
in February 2012 for the two firearms counts. I just don't
know what that math is. It is likely that each of those counts
either occasioned a 50 or \$100 special assessment. But without
knowing the answer, I don't want to guess at it, and I don't
want to get that wrong.

What I would propose to do is give counsel until

Monday to confer with each other. This is going to take a

little bit of archeology and figuring out what the special

assessments were for those counts, and get me a proposed letter

that guides me as to the relevant special assessment.

My intention is to deduct from \$950 the amount of the authorized special assessment for the two 924(c) violations as of February 2012.

Defense, do you have any objection to my proceeding on that point in that manner?

MR. MATTINA: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Government?

MS. DELLIGATTI: No, your Honor.

And I apologize for not knowing the answer today, but someone from our office who was here in 2012 will know.

THE COURT: Yes. No apology necessary. I should have

caught it as well. I came in here, frankly, having not focused on that nuance, and now that I am, I have to get it right.

All right. In any event, subject to that one detail that remains to be supplied, but where I've given you the formula that I will use to supply the detail, does either counsel know of any legal reason why this sentence shall not be imposed as stated, government?

MS. DELLIGATTI: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Defense?

MR. MATTINA: No your Honor.

THE COURT: The sentence, as stated, is imposed.

Ms. Delligatti, I take it while I usually ask if there are any open counts, if there had been any, they would have been disposed of by Judge Batts, correct?

MS. DELLIGATTI: That's right, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Nguyen, I need to advise you, again, of your appellate rights.

To the extent you haven't given up your right to appeal your conviction and your sentence through your plea of guilty, your plea of guilty of long ago and the plea agreement or agreements you entered into with the government long ago, you have the right to appeal the actions taken today, specifically the denial of the application for reduced sentence.

If you're unable to pay for the cost of an appeal, you

may apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of the judgment of conviction, meaning the judgment that I will issue, and I expect that that judgment will issue early next week after I get guidance from counsel about the special assessment.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let me ask defense counsel, insofar as I am generating a new judgment, that is a forum in which I can put in requests to the Bureau of Prisons. There is one obvious one that is staring all of us in the face which involves the stomach condition, but there may be others based on Mr. Nguyen's experience. I'm delighted to include in the judgment such guidance as you would want me to give the Bureau of Prisons.

Do you want to take a moment and confer with each other and with Mr. Nguyen as to recommendations you would like me to make to the Bureau of Prisons contained in the judgment?

That may also have the value of expediting, perhaps, any request, any court order, the effect of any court order relating to the stomach issue.

MR. DEVLIN-BROWN: Yes, your Honor.

If it's OK with the court, given that the judgment is probably not going to issue until at least Monday, if we could have until Monday, perhaps, to put in a letter, because I think

we're thinking both of the stomach issue as well as any requests for where he serves the sentence.

THE COURT: Good thinking.

MR. DEVLIN-BROWN: That might be.

THE COURT: Good thinking.

Ms. Delligatti, under the circumstances the government has no dog in this hunt and that to the extent that the defense may request a different facility, I expect the defense will give me some form of words to use with respect the medical condition. Realistically, you're not going to have an objection, I take it, to my incorporating to the defense's recommendation.

If there is something that I find objectionable, I know what to do with it. I don't expect there to be. I take it I can proceed without seeking your feedback on this.

MS. DELLIGATTI: That's right, your Honor. Yes.

THE COURT: Very good.

Why don't we say by the end of Monday, get me any proposed language. If there is anything that requires any explanation, just put it in the letter. I would be happy to make that recommendation. Look, particularly with respect to the stomach ailment, I'm delighted to editorialize a little bit to get their attention.

Lately, I've been doing that by putting in bold face, not MDC, for example, in judgments that I'm happy to find a way

to drive the point home with respect to the stomach ailment.

Because, Mr. Nguyen, you deserve better than a prison system that doesn't diagnose --

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- a repeated condition. And while resentencing to my mind isn't the right response to that, there is a right response, and it's getting the Bureau of Prisons' act together. So I welcome counsel to come up with something muscular that I can say.

Beyond that, defense counsel, although your appointment was for the limited purpose of the resentencing proceeding, I will treat the care of Mr. Nguyen's stomach condition as subsumed in that assignment, and I will hope that you'll stay on in representing him for the purpose of lighting a fire under the behinds of the Bureau of Prisons to attend to his medical needs.

Can I have your assurance you'll do that?

MR. DEVLIN-BROWN: We will, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else from the government?

MS. DELLIGATTI: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else from the defense?

MR. MATTINA: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Nguyen, I'm almost certain I will never see you again. I'm also certain you'll never see me again. I want to wish you the very best. You have had --

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1 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: -- an unusual journey, to say the least. 3 But I must say this. The letters I received about you from 4 your friends and family, including people who haven't seen you 5 in more than two decades, show that you left those people with 6 a deep reservoir of affection. That says something very 7 positive about you. You're in your late 50s. 8 9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 10 THE COURT: 50 how old? 11 THE DEFENDANT: 57 now, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Trust me. You're still young. And even 13 by the calculations I've been given, you'll be out in under a 14 year. You've got a long way to go on this journey. And I hope 15 that you will be guided by the very positive views that your friends and family have of you and use the rest of your time on 16 17 this earth to live up to their view of you. It's obvious you've got something to offer, and I challenge you to do that. 18 19 I wish you the very, very best. 20 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 We stand adjourned. 23